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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION
187: AN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
On November 8, 1994, California voters approved Proposition 187' by
a margin of 59 percent to 41 percent.2 Labelled the "Save Our State"
initiative by supporters, Prop. 187 prohibits illegal aliens3 from receiving
public education, social welfare benefits and non-emergency health care
services.4 These provisions of the initiative were enjoined from taking effect
1. Subsequently codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 113 (Deering Supp. 1995), CAL. PENAL
CODE § 114 (Deering Supp. 1995), CAL. PENAL CODE § 834(b) (Deering Supp. 1995), CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (Deering Supp. 1995), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130
(Deering Supp. 1995), CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (Deering Supp. 1995), CAL. EDUC. CODE §
66010.8 (Deering Supp. 1995), CAL. GOVT CODE § 53069.65 (Deering Supp. 1995). The terms
"Proposition 187" and "Prop. 187" will be retained, however, for convenience.
2. Stuart Taylor Jr., Popular Hysteria Makes Bad Immigration Policy, CONN. LAW TRIB.,
Dec. 5, 1994, at 14. As of January, 1995, fifteen other states were considering Proposition 187-
style anti-immigration initiatives. Lourdes M. Leslie, Group Seeks to Give State a Prop. 187;
Wants Coast-Style Law on Illegals, ARIZ. REP., Jan. 23, 1995, at BI. See, e.g., John Kennedy,
Closing the Door; Growing Number of Floridians Want to Deny Benefits to Illegal Immigrants,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Tallahassee), Aug. 27, 1995, at GI; Immigration's a National Issue, TIMES
UNION (Albany, NY), Apr. 28, 1995, at A12.
3. The terms "illegal alien," "undocumented alien," "illegal immigrant," and "undocumented
immigrant" will be used interchangeably throughout this Note to refer to those individuals whose
presence in the United States is a federal crime under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1994) (criminalizing
entry or attempted entry into the U.S. by any alien who (1) does so at any time or place other
than as designated by immigration officers; (2) eludes examination or inspection by immigration
officers; (3) conceals or renders false or misleading information; or (4) uses marriage or
commercial enterprise to purposefully evade immigration laws). In 1992, there were an estimated
4.8 million illegal aliens in the U.S. Center for Immigration Studies, Illegal Immigrants Burden
the U.S. Educational System, in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 93, 95 (Bruno Leone et al. eds., 1994).
This figure varies, however, between 3.5 million and 8 million depending on the study consulted.
Marc Lacey, Immigrant Costs Defy Analysis, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 1995, at B1. Approximately
1.5 to 3 million illegal aliens reside in California. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL
ALIENS: ASSESSING ESTIMATES OF FINANCIAL BURDEN ON CALIFORNIA 8-10 (1994) [hereinafter
ASSESSING ESTIMATES]; S.J. Res. 3, Cal. 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Dec. 6, 1994). Roughly 250,000
to 300,000 illegal immigrants enter the U.S. each year. Daniel James, Illegal Immigrants Drain
US. Social Services, in ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, supra, at 80, 86. All of these figures are
extremely speculative because, as the General Accounting Office points out, "persons residing
in the country illegally have an incentive to keep their status hidden from government officials."
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ILLEGAL ALIENS: NATIONAL NET COST ESTIMATES VARY
WIDELY 19-20 (1995) [hereinafter NATIONAL NET COST].
4. The mandates of Proposition 187 which will be discussed in this Note are those codified
at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (Deering Supp. 1995) and CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 130 (Deering Supp. 1995) [hereinafter Sections 5 and 6]. Section 5 provides:
(b) A person shall not receive any public social services to which he or she
may be otherwise entitled until the legal status of that person has been verified as one
of the following: (1) A citizen of the United States. (2) An alien lawfully admitted
as a permanent resident. (3) An alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of
time.
(c) If any public entity in this state to whom a person has applied for public
social services determines or reasonably suspects.., that the person is an alien in the
United States in violation of federal law ... (1) The entity shall not provide the
person with benefits or services.
1
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by U.S. District Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer on December 14, 1994, pending
the resolution of constitutional issues at trial.5
The sentiment of Proposition 187's proponents can be summed up using
the words of Justice Stevens in Mathews v. Diaz:6 "Neither the overnight
visitor, the unfriendly agent of a hostile foreign power, the resident diplomat,
nor the illegal entrant, can advance even a colorable constitutional claim to
a share in the bounty that a conscientious sovereign makes available to its
own citizens and some of its guests."7 Proponents argue that these words
have never been so compelling as today when economic recession has
intensified California's fiscal woes. Opponents of the proposition assert that
the United States is a land of immigrants, and these immigrants, both
documented and undocumented, pay more in taxes than they receive in
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (Deering Supp. 1995). Section 6 provides:
(b) A person shall not receive any health care services from a publicly-funded
health care facility, to which he or she is otherwise entitled until the legal status of
that person has been verified as one of the following: (1) A citizen of the United
States. (2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident. (3) An alien lawfully
admitted for a temporary period of time.
(c) If any publicly-funded health care facility in this state from whom a person
seeks health care services, other than emergency medical care as required by federal
law, determines or reasonably suspects ... that the person is an alien in the United
States in violation of federal law ... (1) The facility shall not provide the person with
services.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (Deering Supp. 1995).
For a concise summary of all the mandates of Proposition 187 see Provisions of 187, DENy.
POST, Nov. 13, 1994, at A33; 187: Denies Services to Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1994, (Part W), at 9.
5. Sections 5 and 6 were enjoined on preemption and due process grounds. Judge Pfaelzer
also justified injunctive relief as to Section 6 on the ground that "the loss of medical services for
illegal aliens could result in greater health risks for the general population." Reporter's
Transcript of Proceedings, League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, No. CV. 94-
7569 MRP, (S.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1994), available in LEXIS, Immig. Library, Extra File. The
exclusion of illegal aliens from public elementary and secondary schools was enjoined on equal
protection grounds. Id. See generally Paul Feldman & Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S. Judge Blocks
Most Sections of Prop. 187; Courts: Jurist Cites Significant Constitutional Questions, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1994, at Al. On November 20, 1995, Judge Pfaelzer ruled, pursuant to
plaintiffs' summary judgment motions, that Prop. 187's education exclusion was preempted by
federal immigration law. Thom Mrozek, Judge Issues Mixed Ruling on Prop. 187, L.A. DAILY
J., Nov. 21, 1995, at 1; Reynolds Holding, Prop. 187 Ruled Mostly Illegal, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
21, 1995, at Al. Judge Pfaelzer also ruled that Sections 5 and 6 were preempted in regard to
the targeting of welfare programs which receive any federal funding. Mrozek, supra, at 1. As
a general critique of Proposition 187, University of Southern California Law Center Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky states that Proposition 187 "is pre-empted by federal immigration laws[,].
. violates due process by terminating benefits without notice or a hearing... [and] denies equal
protection by discriminating against undocumented aliens in their receipt of public health benefits
such as education and medical care." Erwin Chemerinsky, Arguing Proposition 187: Will It
Stand up in Court? NO: 187 Is Unconstitutional, CAL. B.J., Jan. 1995, at 1,1 [hereinafter
Chemermsky]. But see Michael J. Brady, Arguing Proposition 187: Will It Stand up in Court?
YES: No Rights Are Violated, CAL. B.J., Jan. 1995, at 1.
6. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
7. Id. at 80.
[Vol. 32
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government benefits.' Additionally, opponents state that implementation of
Prop. 187 "would create irreparable harm to those denied benefits such as
medical care and to the public which is [thereby] at greater risk from
untreated communicable disease." 9
This Note will address solely the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
issues '° facing Proposition 187's denial of health care and social services
benefits." In Part I, this Note briefly presents the history of equal protec-
tion doctrine as applied to lawfully resident aliens. Part II chronicles the
evolution of equal protection standards. In Part Im, modem alienage equal
protection doctrine is set forth. The importance of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Plyler v. Doe to the equal protection analysis of Prop. 187 is
discussed in Part IV. Part V analyzes the various means by which Prop. 187
could be viewed with intermediate scrutiny. Finally, Part VI applies the
various constitutional tests and principles gleaned from the preceding parts to
determine the validity of Sections 5 and 6 of Prop. 187. In summary, that
analysis reveals that Sections 5 and 6 are clearly constitutionally infirm only
as to illegal alien children.
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
AS APPLIED TO LAWFULLY RESIDENT ALIENS
1 2
State legislation that causes aliens to be treated differently simply because
they lack United States citizenship is judicially reviewable under the Equal
8. Prepared Testimony of Norman Matloff University of California at Davis to the House
Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration the Adverse Impacts of Immigration on
Minorities, FED. NEWs SERV., Apr. 5, 1995, at 7.2.A.4.
9. Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 16.
10. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "[N]or shall any State... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. This Note will not address the possibility that the Supreme Court will reverse its
decision in Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), which is directly on point as to the constitution-
ality of Prop. 187's exclusion of undocumented alien children from public elementary and
secondary schools. It is worth noting, however, that according to Professor Laurence H. Tribe,
"a majority of the justices are likely to 'dig in their heels against what looks like a nativist, racist
and hysterical action. Rather than being swept up in the tide, they would see it as theirs to
stop."' Joan Biskupic, Courts Walk Fine Line on Immigration Issues Raised by California Lmv,
WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1994, at A21. See also Herman Schwartz, Entitlements for Undocument-
edAliens: Is California's Proposition 187 Constitutional? No: The Law Is Clear, Only the Court
Has Changed, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1995, at 43. For an argument that the time is ripe for a reversal
of Plyler see generally Dan Stein, Entitlements for Undocumented Aliens: Is California's
Proposition 187 Constitutional? Yes: The Supreme Court Must Re-Evaluate Existing Law,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1995, at 42. For a Supreme Court case which to an extent undermines Plyler,
see Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (holding that a school district's
refusal to allow an indigent child who lives 16 miles from the nearest school to use a school bus
service for free does not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
12. An "alien" is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(3) (1994).
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Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 It was not until 1886,
however, in the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 4 that the U.S. Supreme Court
held that aliens were "persons" eligible for the protection afforded by the
Equal Protection Clause. In that case the San Francisco Board of Supervi-
sors, pursuant to a city ordinance, withheld laundry operating permits from
resident Chinese applicants. 5 The Court stated that the Equal Protection
Clause was violated because no reason for the disparate treatment existed
"except hostility to the race and nationality to which petitioners belong."' 6
Subsequent to the Yick Wo decision, the Court did not continue in the
development of meaningful equal protection for aliens since states were
permitted to apply disparate treatment if the alienage classification related to
a "special public interest."17 In Patsone v. Pennsylvania" and McCready
v. Virginia9 the Supreme Court held that states had a significant public
interest in reserving natural resources for their citizens and therefore could
prohibit aliens from taking possession of those resources. Further, the Court
in 1923 went so far as to uphold California and Washington statutes which
denied to aliens the right to own land for purposes of farming, on the ground
that a state's interest in regulating the use of its land was a "special interest."2
13. JOHN E. NoWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.12, at 741 (5th
ed. 1995). Similar legislation on the federal level is judicially reviewable under the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 741-42. See, e.g.,
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (federal policy barring noncitizens from civil
service positions invalidated under a blend of equal protection and due process theories); Alcarez
v. Block, 746 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1984) (upholding the implementation of the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1981 which prevented children of families consisting of illegal aliens from
participating in federally subsidized school meal programs).
14. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
15. Id. at 368.
16. Id. at 374.
17. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NoWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 18.12, at 221 (2d ed. 1992). The rationale behind the "special
public interest" doctrine was succinctly stated by Judge Cardozo in People v. Crane, 108 N.E.
427 (N.Y. 1915):
To disqualify aliens is discrimination indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination; for the
principle of exclusion is the restriction of the resources of the state to the advance-
ment and profit of the members of the state.
'.. 'he state, in determining what use shall be made of its own moneys, may
legitimately consult the welfare of its own citizens, rather than that of aliens.
Whatever is a privilege, rather than a right, may be made dependent upon citizenship.
In its war against poverty, the state is not required to dedicate its own resources to
citizens and aliens alike.
Id. at 429, 430.
18. 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
19. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
20. Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 233 (1923) ("In the matter of classification, the
States have wide discretion. Each has its own problems, depending on circumstances existing
there."); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 221 (1923) ("The quality and allegiance of those
who own, occupy and use farm lands within... [the State] are matters of highest importance
and affect the safety and power of the State itself."). See also Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S.
[Vol. 32
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Significant change to equal protection alienage doctrine occurred in the
1948 Supreme Court decisions of Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission"
and Oyama v. California.22 In Takahashi, the Court struck down a Califor-
nia statute which made aliens who were ineligible for citizenship under
federal law, ineligible for state commercial fishing licenses.23 The Court
held that state laws which impose discriminatory burdens on the entrance or
residence of aliens are violative of equal protection because "all persons
lawfully in this country shall abide in any state on an equality of legal
privileges with all citizens under non-discriminatory laws." '24 In Oyama, the
Court invalidated a California law which prohibited aliens who were
ineligible for U.S. citizenship from owning or transferring agricultural
land.25 The Court found that the State's classification was based solely on
racial descent 26 Takahashi, Oyama and other subsequent decisions27 greatly
reduced the scope of the "special public interest" doctrine because (1) the
Court had begun to give a broader interpretation to Congress' plenary power
in the realm of alienage legislation; and (2) classifications based upon
alienage were increasingly being viewed as suspect.
28
392 (1927) (equal protection not violated by city ordinance prohibiting aliens from operating pool
and billiard rooms because city's view that an alien's associations, experiences and interests
render him less qualified to operate such a business was not unreasonable); Webb v. O'Brien,
263 U.S. 313 (1923) (state law upheld which prohibited the making of food crop contracts with
aliens because a state's strength and safety could be jeopardized by aliens living on and
cultivating its farmlands); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (state requirement that public
contractors employ only U.S. citizens upheld because states have considerable authority to
prescribe the conditions under which public works are done).
21. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
22. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
23. Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 412.
24. Id. at 420.
25. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 636.
26. Id. at 640.
27. E.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (equal protection violated by state
statutes denying welfare benefits to resident aliens).
28. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-23, at 1547 (2d ed. 1988).
The term "suspect" denotes the presence of "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities."
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). A suspect class can
be defined as a group which has historically been relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). See also JOHN H. ELY,
DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST 150 (1980) ("[Tlhe doctrine of suspect classifications is a roundabout
way of uncovering official attempts to inflict inequality for its own sake-to treat a group worse
not in the service of some overriding social goal but largely for the sake of simply disadvan-
taging its members."). Suspect classifications (race, national origin and alienage in certain
instances) require a ;ourt to strictly scrutinize such legislated classifications to ensure that they
are narrowly tailored to promote a compelling interest. NOWYAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, §
14.3, at 602.
5
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II. EVOLUTION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
ANALYSIS-STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Prior to the Warren era,29 equal protection analysis supported only
minimal judicial intervention." Equal protection merely required that the
legislative differentiation have some practical relation to the object of the
legislation.3' Occasionally, however, the Court veered to the more exacting
standard enunciated in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia:32 "[T]he
classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having afair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.""3
The arrival of the Warren era heralded a new approach to equal
protection doctrine. Although the deferential style of older equal protec-
tion34 was maintained in the context of economic and social welfare
legislation,35 equal protection issues were now being decided within a rigid,
two-tiered analytic framework:36 (1) strict scrutiny of legislative classifica-
tions which discriminated against suspect classes37 or that encroached upon
fundamental rights;3" and (2) rational basis review of legislative classifica-
29. Chief Justice Earl Warren presided over the Court from 1953 to 1969.
30. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrrTIONAL LAW 602 (12th ed. 1991).
31. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949).
32. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
33. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). See also Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v.Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935); Frost v. Corp. Comm'n
of Oklahoma, 278 U.S. 515 (1929); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928).
See generally GUNTHER, supra note 30, at 609.
34. "[A] distinction in legislation is not arbitrary, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it ...." Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357(1916). "A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend ... [equal protection]
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some
inequality." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). "[T]he rule of
equality permits many practical inequalities." Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S.
283, 296 (1898).
35. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
36. See GUNTHER, supra note 30, at 603.
37. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (legal alienage); Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (national origin).
38. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry); Chicago PoliceDep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (First Amendment rights); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.618 (1969) (right to interstate travel); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (right of political
association); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (right to free exercise of religion); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (right to criminal appeals); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right
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tions not involving suspect classes or fundamental rights.39
Under the strict scrutiny standard the Court posed the question whether
the statutory scheme was necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest.40  In reality, as Gerald Gunther remarked, strict scrutiny was
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."4'
Its polar opposite, rationality review, was as deferential as strict scrutiny
was strict: "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 2
Discontent with this rigid review scheme surfaced in the 1970s and was
evidenced by Justice Marshall's dissent in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez:43 "The Court apparently seeks to establish that equal protection
cases fall into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate
standard of review .... But this Court's decisions defy such easy categori-
zation."'4 Indeed, "the [two-tiered] model offered no gradations for rights
of intermediate importance., 45  The Royster Guano Co. rationality standard
thus was resurrected by the Burger Court to serve as the predicate for an
intermediate standard of review.47
39. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 (1973) ("When classifications do not call
for strict judicial scrutiny, . . . [rationality review] is the only approach consistent with proper
judicial regard for the judgments of the Legislative Branch."). See, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. of
Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (state statute which restricted inmates' right to receive absentee
ballots with which to vote judged constitutional under deferential standard because right to vote,
per se, not at stake).
40. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
41. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
8 (1972). Whether modem strict scrutiny retains this fatalistic quality is uncertain, at least in the
realm of race-based classifications. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158,
188 (1995) (holding that federal affirmative action program entitled to strict scrutiny with the
following caveat: "[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal
in fact' (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
42. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (emphasis added). Rationality review
has survived in this basic form to the present day. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637,
2643 (1993) ("[C]ourts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature's
generalizations even when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends."); F.C.C. v. Beach
Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993) ("[A]ny reasonably conceivable state of
facts . . . could provide a rational basis for the classification."); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (stating that so long as a legislature "could rationally
have decided" that a statute would fulfill its purpose, it would survive); Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) ("[The drawing of lines that create distinctions
is peculiarly a legislative task .... Perfection in making the necessary classifications is neither
possible nor necessary.").
43. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
44. Id. at 98.
45. Cobum v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 987 (D. Kan. 1985).
46. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger presided over the Court from 1969 to 1986.
47. Note, Refining the Methods of Middle-Tier Scrutiny: A New Proposal for Equal
Protection, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1501, 1507 (1983). When the Royster Guano Co. standard was
resurrected in the early 1970's it masqueraded initially as rationality review, only with "bite."
See GUNTHER, supra note 30, at 605 n.10, 620 n.6. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971) (Idaho intestacy statute which mandated preference of males over females as estate
administrators struck down under purported rational relation standard as an "arbitrary legislative
7
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The intermediate standard of equal protection review was first clearly
established in the gender-based classifications cases.4" Gender classifications
pass constitutional muster only when the government can demonstrate that it
has employed a classification which is substantially related to an important
governmental objective.49 This emerging standard was next applied in the
illegitimacy classification cases."
According to Professor Gunther, modem equal protection analysis is in
flux: "[T]wo-tiered analysis has not been formally abandoned, but the
intensity of review under the lower tier has occasionally been sharpened,5'
and varieties of intermediate levels of scrutiny 2 have surfaced."53 Besides
making for murky doctrine, legal scholars have suggested that the Supreme
Court's failure to clearly define an intermediate standard of review creates the
potential for indiscriminate exercise of independent judicial review of all
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause").
48. JOHN E. NOWVAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 532 (3d ed. 1986). E.g.,
Mississippi Univ. For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (statute excluding males from state
school nursing program invalidated); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (equal
protection violated by Louisiana statute which permitted only the husband to unilaterally dispose
of community property); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (Missouri
statute invalidated which entitled a widower to death benefits upon a showing of either
incapacitation or dependency on his wife's earnings whereas widows were entitled to such
benefits only upon a showing of spousal dependency); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)(Oklahoma statute which required males to be 21, but females only 18, to purchase 3.2% beer
ruled violative of equal protection).
49. Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150. But see Harris v. Forklift Systems, 114 S. Ct. 367, 373(1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that whether gender classifications are inherently
suspect and hence subject to strict scrutiny is an open question).
50. E.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Trimble involved an Illinois intestate
succession statute which provided that illegitimate children could inherit only from their mothers.
Id. at 763. The statute was found to violate equal protection because penalizing children in an
attempt to influence adult behavior was ineffectual and unjust. Id. at 769-70. The Court did not
expressly state that it was applying intermediate scrutiny. Rather, Justice Powell referred to the
applicable level of scrutiny as "not toothless" and something more than rational relationship. Id.
at 766-67. See also Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (six year statute of limitations on
paternity suit claims not substantially related to Pennsylvania's interest of preventing prosecution
of fraudulent claims because under certain circumstances the state permits paternity issues to be
litigated more than six years after the child's birth); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (two
year statute of limitations on paternity and child support claims not substantially related to
Tennessee's interest in preventing stale and fraudulent claims because problems of proof were
not substantial and the state tolled most other actions brought by a minor). See generally NOVAK
& ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.14, at 758.
51. See, e.g., James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (Kansas statute which provided for the
recoupment of legal defense fees from indigent criminal defendants without regard to the
protective exemptions available to civil judgment debtors held violative of equal protection);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (statute which made children of unwed fathers wards of
the state without a hearing to establish parental fitness held violative of equal protection).
52. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (city
ordinance which required special use permit for operation of group homes for the mentally
retarded invalidated); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (amendment to Food Stamp Act
invalidated which made households containing unrelated individuals ineligible for benefits).
53. GUNTHER, supra note 30, at 606.
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legislative classifications under the guise of a rational basis test. 4
III. ALIENAGE AND MODERN EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has opted to analyze alienage cases under a different
standard of review depending upon the interests involved and the level of
invidious discrimination present." Alienage cases can be divided into three
categories. 6 The category deserving of strict scrutiny, state legislative
decisions which classify persons on the basis of alienage in order to deny
them economic benefits or limit their opportunity to engage in private sector
economic activity, is based on the premise enunciated in U.S. v. Carolene
Products Co. 7 There, the Court stated that the central judicial concern is
to root out any governmental action which is tainted by a prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities" which tends to curtail the operation of those
political processes that ordinarily would be relied on to protect minorities. 9
Alienage classifications which relate to the allocation of power or
positions in a state's political process will be upheld under the traditional
rational basis test.6" In Sugarman v. Dougall,6' the Court explained that
state government officers "perform functions that go to the heart of represen-
tative government" '62 and since aliens are ineligible to vote and thereby
participate in a state's democratic political institutions, they could be excluded
from positions in that representative government. 3 Rational basis scrutiny
is also appropriate in circumstances where Congress employs alienage
54. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.3, at 608; TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16.3, at
1445.
55. This is the so-called "sliding scale" approach to equal protection analysis endorsed by
Justice Marshall in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.12, at 742-44;
GUNTHER, supra note 30, at 680. As used in this section, "alienage," unless otherwise stated,
does not encompass "illegal" alienage.
56. See generally 3 ROTUNDA & NO\VAK, supra note 17, § 18.12, at 218.
57. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
58. "Discrete" and "insular minorities" have been defined as referring to groups "held at
arm's length by the group or groups that possess dominant political and economic power." Louis
Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM L. REV. 1093, 1105 n.72
(1982).
59. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
60. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWVAK, supra note 17, § 18.12, at 218.
61. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
62. Id. at 647 (dictum).
63. Id. at 647-49 (dictum). See also 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 17, § 18.12, at 218
("The state clearly has a legitimate interest in reserving positions in the self-governance process
for U.S. citizens."). See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (prohibiting aliens
from becoming probation officers); Ambach v. Nonvick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (prohibiting aliens
from becoming public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (prohibiting
aliens from becoming state troopers). Cf Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (holding that
aliens may hold positions as notary publics because only ministerial and clerical duties are
involved).
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classifications affecting the dispensation of economic benefits."
Finally, the category of alienage cases which qualifies for intermediate
scrutiny appears to be limited to a state's legislation which attempts to deny
tuition-free public education to undocumented alien children. 5
IV. PLYLER V. DOE
In Plyler v. Doe, after determining that illegal aliens were protected by
the Equal Protection Clause,66 the Supreme Court67 held that a Texas
statute which denied free public education to undocumented school-age
children was violative of the Equal Protection Clause because such a denial
did not further a substantial state interest." The Court refused to subject the
Texas statute to strict scrutiny because education was not a fundamental
right69 and illegal aliens were not a suspect class.7" The Court declined to
apply the rubber-stamp rational relation test and opted instead for an
intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny was used
primarily because the children against whom the statute was directed were
being punished for their parents' misconduct and were powerless to change
their own immigration status.7"
Further, although the majority believed that education was not a
fundamental right,72 Justice Brennan explained that "neither . . .[is educa-
tion] some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of
64. NOVAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.12, at 754; see, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67 (1976) (upholding congressional requirement that aliens live in the U.S. for five years
and be admitted for permanent residence before becoming eligible for benefits provided by
federal medical insurance program).
65. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Professors Nowak and Rotunda are of the
view, however, that "fall of the Court's [alienage] decisions since 1970 ... would appear to
be consistent if the Court were using an intermediate standard of review ...." (emphasis
added). NOvAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.12, at 742.
66. "Use of the phrase 'within its jurisdiction' ... confirms ... the understanding that the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to anyone, citizen or stranger, who is subject
to the laws of... [the] State." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215.
67. Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion and was joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackman, Powell and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger filed a dissenting opinion and was joined
by Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor.
68. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230. For an exhaustive treatment of the Plyler decision see Scott
D. Livingston, Note, Illegal Aliens and the Misguided Search for Equal Protection, 11 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 599 (1984); John F. Casey, Note, The Quasi Fundamental Right Emerges in Equal
Protection Analysis, 19 NEw ENG. L. REv. 151 (1983); Mary J. Moltenbrey, Note, Alternative
Models of Equal Protection Analysis, 24 B.C. L. REV. 1363 (1983).
69. Piier, 457 U.S. at 223. See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 33 (1972) (stating that the key to discovering whether a right is fundamental lies in assessing
whether the right is explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution).
70. Plyter, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19 (suspect status does not exist where entry into the class is
the product of voluntary illegal action). For a complete definition of "suspect," see sources cited
supra note 28.
71. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
72. Justice Marshall filed a concurring opinion, however, to stress his belief that education
was indeed a fundamental right. Id. at 230 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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social welfare legislation. Both the importance of education in maintaining
our basic institutions, and the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of
the child, mark the distinction."73 This emphasis on unaccountability for
their undocumented status and the importance of education led the Court to
conclude that Texas' desire to conserve limited state educational resources,74
standing alone, was not a substantial state interest which would justify denial
of the benefit at issue.75
The Court went on to list three colorable state interests (which were
practically synonymous with Texas' fiscal preservation interest) that might be
supported by the Texas statute: (1) "mitigating the potentially harsh economic
effects of sudden shifts in population";76 (2) "improv[ing] the overall
quality of education";77 and (3) maintaining within the State the social and
political benefits derived from education.7" These discerned interests,
however, were not substantially effectuated by the exclusion of illegal
immigrant children from public education.79
The Court did indicate that it was not prohibiting states entirely from
according preferential treatment to U.S. citizens and lawfully resident aliens
in the disbursement of government benefits."0 Indeed, Justice Brennan
stated that "[p]ersuasive arguments support the view that a State may
withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within the United
73. Id. at 221. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger characterized the majority's analysis as
creating a "quasi-fundamental" right. Id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
74. The proponents of Proposition 187 likewise claim a desire to stop the drain on
California's treasury: "The People of California ... have suffered and are suffering economic
hardship caused by the presence of illegal aliens in this state." Proposition 187 § 1, available
in LEXIS, Immig. Library, Extra File.
75. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220-21.
76. Id. at 228. Justice Brennan elaborated, stating that "unchecked unlawful migration might
impair the State's economy generally, or the State's ability to provide some important service."
Id. at 228 n.23.
77. Id. at 229.
78. Id. at 230.
79. As to the first interest, the Court stated:
[E]ven making the doubtful assumption that the net impact of illegal aliens on the
economy of the State is negative, ... "[charging] [sic] tuition to undocumented
children constitutes a ludicrously ineffectual attempt to stem the tide of illegal
immigration," at least when compared with the alternative of prohibiting the
employment of illegal aliens.
Id. at 228-29 (second alteration in original) (quoting Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 585 (E.D.
Tex. 1978)).
As to the second interest, the Court explained that even if improvement in the quality of
education were a likely result of barring undocumented children from the schools of the State,
undocumented children were an inappropriate target for exclusion because they were indistin-
guishable from legally resident alien children in terms of educational cost and need. Id. at 229.
The third interest was not effectuated by the denial simply because the Court believed that
undocumented children were just as likely to employ the education provided by the State within
the State's borders as they were elsewhere. Id. at 230.
80. NOWVAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, at 755.
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States is the product of their own unlawful conduct."'" In this regard he
explained that "the States are [not] without any power to deter the influx of
persons entering the United States against federal law, and whose numbers
might have a discernible impact on traditional state concerns." 2 Indeed,
according to the Court, such state behavior would be more likely to withstand
equal protection scrutiny if the state were following the lead of some
federally prescribed rule. 3 Justice Brennan stated that "[flaced with an
equal protection challenge respecting the treatment of aliens, we agree that the
courts must be attentive to congressional policy; the exercise of congressional
power might well affect the State's prerogatives to afford differential
treatment to a particular class of aliens."84
V. IS INTERMEDIATE REVIEW THE APPROPRIATE JUDICIAL STANDARD
WITH WHICH TO SCRUTINIZE SECTIONS 5 AND 6 OF PROPOSITION 187?
Intermediate review of the pertinent sections of Proposition 187 would
clearly be appropriate in either of two instances: (1) the direct involvement
of a quasi-fundamental right coupled with the presence of a pseudo quasi-
suspect class;85 or (2) the presence of a quasi-suspect class.8 6 Intermediate
scrutiny might arguably be appropriate in a third instance: the incidental
burdening of a quasi-fundamental right.87 If none of these three instances
81. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 228 n.23. Traditional state concerns include education, U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct.
1624, 1640 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring); child welfare, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836,
855 (1990); the terms and procedures for divorce, Att'y Gen. of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476
U.S. 898, 906 n.5 (1986); the plight of indigents, Jefferson County Pharm. Assn. v. Abbott Labs.,
460 U.S. 150, 154 n.7 (1983); family relations, Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979); the
licensing of oil terminal facilities, Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325,
337 (1972); the maintenance of high legal standards, Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Assn., 389
U.S. 217, 225 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting); and creating and defining property interests, U.S.
v. First Nati. City Bank. 379 U.S. 378, 407 (1965).
83. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224-25. See also id. at 251 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See De Canas
v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (California law prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal
aliens not preempted under the Supremacy Clause). Whether California, through Prop. 187, is
following the lead of a federally prescribed rule is discussed infra at part V.D.
84. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. As to Texas' denial of free public education, the Court
explained: "[W]e are unable to find in the congressional immigration scheme any statement of
policy that might weigh significantly in arriving at an equal protection balance concerning the
State's authority to deprive these children of an education." Id. at 224-25.
85. See discussion infra part V.A. This was the situation presented in Plyler. I have coined
the term, "pseudo quasi-suspect" to mean a class which (1) the Supreme Court has analogized
to an existing quasi-suspect class; and (2) meets only a majority of the quasi-suspect criteria (see
discussion infra part V.B.). Undocumented alien children most likely constitute a pseudo quasi-
suspect class.
86. See discussion infra part V.B.
87. "Incidental burdening" of a quasi-fundamental right is distinguishable from "direct
involvement" of a quasi-fundamental right in that the former involves a statute which targets a
"right" which in turn causes the burdening of a quasi-fundamental right (see discussion infra part
V.C.). "Direct involvement" of a quasi-fundamental right occurs when a statute explicitly targets
a quasi-fundamental right.
12
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are present, then some level of scrutiny below intermediate review is
appropriate. Moreover, if one of these instances is present, but to an
uncertain degree, the fact that the operation of Sections 5 and 6 may be
consistent with a federal mandate might weigh in favor of applying some
level of scrutiny below intermediate review."s
A. Are Quasi-Fundamental Rights Directly Involved?
As defined in Plyler, a quasi-fundamental right is one which is important
to maintaining basic institutions and whose deprivation has a lasting impact
on the life of the denied recipient.89 The Plyler Court stated that the right
to a free public education met the first prong of this test because education
is essential to maintaining our democratic political system, productive
economy and cultural heritage.9" As to the second prong, the Court found
that the deprivation of education forecloses the means by which a child can
achieve self-reliance and self-sufficient participation in society.9'
Whether any of the welfare programs targeted by Prop. 187 dispense aid
that is quasi-fundamental in nature can be determined by application of the
Plyer two-pronged test. The social welfare programs from which Proposition
187 seeks to exclude illegal aliens include92 Aid to Families with Dependent
88. See discussion infra part V.D.
89. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. Justice Brennan may have answered this analysis as to the
receipt of welfare benefits before he was even able to state the rule: "[N]either is... [education]
merely some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation." Id. (emphasis added). Chief Justice Burger points out this distinction in his dissent:
"Is the Court suggesting that education is more 'fundamental' than food, shelter, or medical
care?" Id. at 248 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Plaintiffs Gregorio T., et al., in their class action
suit against Proposition 187, assert that "[t]he benefits and services denied by Proposition 187
are fundamental or quasi-fundamental rights." Gregorio T. v. Wilson, No. 94-7652, 55 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 10, 1994) (complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief). Note, however, that the
Supreme Court has never ruled that there is any right, let alone a fundamental right, to receive
welfare benefits or services. NONVAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.43, at 947.
90. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
91. Id. at 222.
92. Undocumented immigrants are already ineligible to participate in most federal public
assistance programs: Aid to Families with Dependant Children, Supplemental Security Income,
Unemployment Insurance, Refugee Assistance (unless national of Cuba or Haiti), Food Stamps,
Title IV Federal Loans, and Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). They are eligible however for
Medicaid (emergency services), Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and
Children (WIC), School Lunch & Breakfast Program, Headstart Education Program, and Federal
Housing. INFORMATION PLUS, IMMIGRATION AND ILLEGAL ALIENS: BURDEN OR BLESSING? 107(Alison Landes et al. eds., 1993); NATIONAL NET COSTS, supra note 3, at 4-5. Data collected
by David S. North and Marian F. Houstoun indicate that illegal immigrants do receive some
forms of welfare to which they are not entitled (food stamps, unemployment insurance, job
training). Julian L. Simon, Illegal Immigrants Do Not Drain U.S. Social Services, in ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION, supra note 3, at 113, 114. Further, because "illegal aliens may apply for AFDC
and food stamps on behalf of their U.S. citizen children . . . [these] benefits help support
[undocumented members of] the child's family." ASSESSING ESTIMATES, supra note 3, at 3-4.
See, e.g., Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458 (Cal. 1984).
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Children (AFDC),93 food stamps,94 general relief,95 Supplemental Security
Income/State Supplementary Program (SSI/SSP),96 Child Welfare Services
(CWS) and Adult Protective Services (APS).97 The primary publicly funded
health care service which is targeted is the Medi-Cal/Medicaid program.9"
1. Is the Right to Receive Subsistence
Welfare Benefits99 Quasi-Fundamental?
As to the "maintenance of basic institutions" prong of the Plyler quasi-
fundamental rights test, there seemingly is no clear causal connection between
the receipt of subsistence welfare benefits and the maintenance of this
country's political, economic and cultural heritage. Unlike education,
93. AFDC is ajoint federal and state assistance program codified at 42 U.S.C.S §§ 601-617
(Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1995) and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11200-11523 (Deering
1994 & Supp. 1995), respectively. The program "provides cash grants to children and their
parents or guardians if a family's income is insufficient to meet their basic needs." CAL. DEP'T
OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, FACING THE CHALLENGE: A PROFILE OF POVERTY IN CALIFORNIA
18 (1988) [hereinafter FACING THE CHALLENGE]. The State and its counties share the program's
financing and administration costs with the federal government. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF
RESEARCH, REALIGNING STATE & COUNTY RESPONSIBILITIES 29 (1983) [hereinafter REALIGNING
RESPONSIBILITIES].
94. California's participation in the federal food stamp program (7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2032
(1994)) is governed by CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 18900-18923 (Deering 1994 & Supp.
1995). The federal government funds and controls the program. REALIGNING RESPONSIBILITIES,
supra note 93, at 29. Like AFDC, California counties pay a portion of the program's administra-
tion costs. Id. Instead of cash assistance, qualified individuals receive coupons which may be
redeemed for food. ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, LOW-INCOME SINGLE MOTHERS AND
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 27 (1980) [hereinafter LOW-INCOME].
95. Codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 17000-17608 (Deering 1994 & Supp. 1995),
the general relief program provides support to indigent individuals who do not otherwise qualify
for cash assistance programs. LOW-INCOME, supra note 94, at 31. The program is funded
entirely by California counties. Id. at 32.
96. SSI/SSP is ajoint federal and state assistance program codified at 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1381-
1383d (Law. Co-op. 1993 & Supp. 1995) and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 12000-12700
(Deering 1994 & 1995 Supp.), respectively. The program "provides cash grant assistance to
aged, blind or disabled persons who meet... income and resource requirements." FACING THE
CHALLENGE, supra note 93, at 18. California's SSP augments the federal SSI in amounts set
forth at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 12200 (Deering 1995).
97. These two programs are jointly funded by the State and federal government and are
administered by county welfare departments. Lo\V-INCOME, supra note 94, at 34. CWS (CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 16500-16521 (Deering 1994 & Supp. 1995)) encompasses a variety of
programs intended to prevent or remedy the neglect, abuse, exploitation and delinquency of
children. CAL. VELF. & INST. CODE § 16501 (Deering Supp. 1995). APS (CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE §§ 15600-15755 (Deering 1994 & Supp. 1995)) comprises preventive and remedial
activities designed to protect adults incapable of protecting themselves. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 15610.10 (Deering Supp. 1995).
98. Medi-Cal is the State counterpart to the federal Medicaid program (42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1396-
1396u (Law. Co-op. 1993 & Supp 1995)) and is codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§
14000-14685 (Deering 1994 & Supp. 1995). The State/federal program offers services such as
physician office visits, prescriptions, dental services, hospitalization, laboratory services and
nursing home care. LOW-INCOM, supra note 94, at 33. The program is jointly financed by the
State and federal government and is administered by the State under broad federal guidelines.
42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (1994).
99. E.g., AFDC, the food stamp and general relief programs and SSI/SSP.
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subsistence welfare is neither a "'vital civic institution"' " responsible for
the preservation of our democratic form of government, nor is it a "'primary
vehicle"" 0' for the transmittal of important societal values. Indeed, this
country's democratic form of government has endured unfettered for nearly
150 years without any significant federal welfare legislation in place.' 2
Further, to say that subsistence welfare is not a primary vehicle for the
transmittal of important societal values merely states the obvious: welfare was
never designed to transmit anything other than the means with which to attain
"the enjoyment of health and common blessings of life."'0 3 Nevertheless,
while subsistence welfare may not maintain this country's basic institutions
in the same sense as education, the Supreme Court has stated that "welfare
guards against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of
unjustified frustration and insecurity." ' 4 Such a "malaise" could theoreti-
cally undermine this country's political, economic and social institutions. '
However, the mechanism of operation is simply too indirect and the extent
of any "undermining" too uncertain to satisfy the Plyler test.' 6 Clearly, the
receipt of subsistence welfare benefits does not rise to the same level as the
receipt of education, as the latter relates to the direct and certain maintenance
of this country's political, economic and cultural heritage.
In the event that the Plyler quasi-fundamental rights test may be deemed
applicable in the disjunctive sense, the second prong of the test will also be
applied. The importance to the recipient of certain types of welfare was
thoroughly discussed in Goldberg v. Kelly. The issue before the Supreme
100. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (quoting Abington School District v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 (1963)).
101. Id. (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979)).
102. "For much of America's history, social welfare needs were addressed exclusively
through the family, voluntary organizations, and local governments." FORD FOUNDATION, THE
COMMON GOOD 2 (1989). "[The New Deal was the great transformation. It brought the nation
into the mainstream of welfare state developments from which it had consciously been standing
aside up to then." DANIEL LEVINE, POVERTY AND SOCIETY 241 (1988).
103. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1594 (6th ed. 1990). See ScoTr D. GERBER, To SECURE
THESE RIGHTS 194 (1995) (stating that the concepts of liberty and equality underlying the
Declaration of Independence and the political philosophy present at the country's founding
prohibited an expansive role of welfare beyond preserving opportunities for the pursuit of
happiness); MORTIMER J. ADLER & WILLIAM GORMAN, THE AMERICAN TESTAMENT 39-40
(1975) (explaining that the right to the possession of property or its economic equivalents was
deliberately omitted from the Declaration of Independence and thereby relegated to the role of
facilitating the pursuit of happiness).
104. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
105. JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY
27-28 (1991) (identifying as a driving force behind welfare policy "the belief that the poor pose
silent, insidious threats to dominant ideologies" and the economic and social order). But cf
LEVINE, supra note 102, at 270-71 (stating that prior to the Great Depression, social welfare
legislation "was not [considered] a legitimate tool at all" for ameliorating class conflict in order
to avoid national disunity).
106. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 316 (1985) (contrasting the causal connections
between providing public assistance to a town ravaged by natural disaster to prevent looting and
providing food stamps to the nation to prevent revolution).
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Court was whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
required the recipient of AFDC or Home Relief aid0 7 to be afforded an
evidentiary hearing before the termination of such aid.' 8 In holding that
due process requires an adequate hearing before termination of welfare
benefits, the Court declared that the justified desire to protect public funds did
not outweigh 'the individual's overpowering need in this unique situation not
to be wrongfully deprived of assistance."" 0' 9  The Court reasoned that
"[w]elfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring
within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to others
to participate meaningfully in the life of the community."" 0.
The Goldberg Court's enunciation of the critical importance of subsis-
tence welfare to the needy recipient'. would seem to satisfy the "lasting
impact" prong of the Plyler quasi-fundamental rights test. This is especially
apparent when the denial of subsistence welfare affects indigent children
given the distinct economic and social disadvantages they face as a conse-
quence of poverty." 2 As to indigent adults, they too require a minimum
amount of life's basic necessities in order to be productive members of
society."' Both subsistence welfare and free public education can thus be
seen as prerequisites to self-reliance and meaningful participation within the
community." 4
107. Home Relief aid is financed entirely by New York state and local governments and
assists any person unable to secure support from other sources. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 256 n.1.
In this regard, New York's Home Relief assistance program is similar to California's general
relief program. See supra note 95.
108. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 260.
109. Id. at 261 (quoting Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (1968)).
110. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
111. See also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 644 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating
that food stamp benefits are necessary to an indigent family's very survival); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (stating that a family's ability to subsist may depend upon
their receipt of welfare).
112. SoTnuos A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 212 (1984). Poverty
places children "at greater risk of hunger, homelessness, sickness, physical or mental disability,
violence, educational failure, teen parenthood, and family stress" which in turn effects their long-
term prospects for achievement. ARLOC SHERMAN, CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, WASTING
AMERICA'S FUTURE xvii (1994). See also Norman Garmezy, Resiliency and Vulnerability to
Adverse Developmental Outcomes Associated with Poverty, in SAVING CHILDREN AT RISK 45,
48 (Travis Thompson & Susan C. Hupp eds., 1992).
113. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.42, at 946.
114. Although it may be asserted that paltry sums of public assistance disbursed to the poor
hardly provide a means with which to meaningfully participate in society, the fact remains that
'those who receive public aid, including financial assistance and social services, are more
fortunate than some others in similar economic circumstances who receive no financial aid or
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2. Is the Receipt of Medical Welfare
Services" 5 a Quasi-Fundamental Right?
Under the first prong of the Plyler quasi-fundamental rights test, the right
to receive medical welfare services suffers from the same infirmities as does
the right to receive subsistence welfare benefits. The receipt of both of these
two forms of public assistance is neither directly nor certainly related to the
maintenance of this country's basic institutions." 6
However, like the deprivation of subsistence welfare benefits, the
deprivation of medical welfare services has been determined by the Supreme
Court to result in a lasting impact on the life of the denied recipient. In
Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty.," 7 the Court determined that an Arizona
statute which conditioned the receipt of free non-emergency medical care on
the applicant's residency within a county for one year was repugnant to equal
protection." 8  The case was decided using strict scrutiny analysis because
the denial of the welfare service at issue impinged upon the fundamental right
of interstate travel." 9 The Court reasoned that a seriously ill indigent
would be inhibited from migrating to a state which denied him or her access
to medical care for a full year.'20 In that regard, the Court stated that
"medical care is as much a 'basic necessity of life' to an indigent as welfare
assistance."' 2'
Like the receipt of public education, the receipt of non-emergency
medical care can be seen as a necessary condition to the attainment of self-
reliance and self-sufficient participation within the community. The
deprivation of non-emergency medical care clearly has a profound inhibitory
effect upon the ability of an indigent adult to seek and retain gainful
employment.' 22 The deprivation of non-emergency medical care likewise
115. E.g., Medi-Cal/Medicaid.
116. See discussion supra part V.A.1.
117. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
118. Id. at 269.
119. Id. at 261-62. See generally Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) ("[U]n
moving from State to State . . . appellees were exercising a constitutional right, and any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional.").
120. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 257.
121. Id. at 259 (citation omitted). The Court further stated that "governmental privileges
or benefits necessary to basic sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater constitution-
al significance than less essential forms of governmental entitlements." Id. See also In re
Marriage of Benjamins, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) ("Next to food, clothing
and shelter, the necessity for proper medical care is at least as much a fundamental requisite of
everyday living as is transportation or education.").
122. CAL. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ADVISORY COMM'N, CALIFORNIA'S
UNFINISHED BATTLE: THE WAR ON POVERTY 48 (1989) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA'S UNFINISHED
BATTLE]. It may seem incongruous to assert that the denial of medical welfare services to illegal
alien adults restricts their ability to achieve and sustain employment when federal law already
prohibits such employment (see infra note 193). Nonetheless, the fact remains that California
relies to a great extent on undocumented workers as a source of cheap labor. Phil Reeves,
17
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serves as an impediment to an indigent child's chances for future develop-
ment and achievement.' The obstacles imposed by the deprivation of this
"basic necessity of life" indicate that the receipt of medical welfare services
satisfies the second prong of the Plyler quasi-fundamental rights test.
3. Is the Right to Receive Miscellaneous Welfare
Services24 Quasi-Fundamental?
Rights to miscellaneous welfare services such as CWS and APS are
unlikely to be accorded quasi-fundamental status. These services probably
occupy the netherland which exists for "mere[ ... governmental 'benefit[s]'
indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation."' 25  This
can be seen by the Supreme Court's treatment of an individual's right to
receive non-subsistence welfare benefits.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,126 the Court held that Fifth Amendment due
process did not require that an evidentiary hearing be held prior to the
termination of Social Security disability benefits. 27 The Court distin-
guished its prior due process subsistence welfare case, Goldberg, by noting
that the potential deprivation an individual suffers by way of termination of
disability payments is less than that suffered when subsistence welfare is
denied to individuals on the very margin of subsistence.12 1 The Court
California Puts Squeeze on Illegal Latin Laborers, OTAWA CIZEN, Oct. 5, 1994, at A6;
Testimony April 05, 1995 Donald L. Huddle Professor Emeritus of Economics, FED. Doc.
CLEARING HOUSE CONG. TESTIMONY, Apr. 5, 1995, at 1.5; Ronald Brownstein & Richard
Simon, Hospitality Turns into Hostility; California Has a Long History of Welcoming Newcomers
for Their Cheap Labor-until Times Turn Rough, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1993, at Al. Thus, usingthe second prong of the Plyler quasi-fundamental rights test to deny medical care to indigent
illegal aliens while the State reaps the benefits of their cheap labor may not be in accordance
with notions of fairness implicit within the concept of equal protection. See Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) ("Ihe concept[] of equal protection... [arises] from our Americanideal of fairness .... "); BARBER, supra note 112, at 212 ("The right to feasible levels of...
[public assistance] benefits results from the nation's aspiration to a state of affairs in which all
can reaffirm the Constitution as equally protective of eveyone...
123. Garmezy, supra note 112, at 48. As noted in supra note 122, of equal impediment to
the attainment of self-reliance and self-sufficient participation within the community is the federalgovernment's prohibition on the employment of undocumented aliens. However, a status-based
deprivation hich serves as an obstacle to individual achievement is irreconcilable with the Equal
Protection Clause. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982). Considering that the "'benefits of
education are not reserved to those whose productive utilization of them is a certainty,' Id. at
222 n.20 (citation omitted), the fact thatfederal law poses a barrier to an illegal alien child's
realization of the benefits inhering from the receipt of public medical assistance should have no
bearing on the Plyler quasi-fundamental rights test.
124. E.g., Child Welfare Services and Adult Protective Services.
125. Piyler, 457 U.S. at 221. See supra note 89 for the potential significance of this
statement as to the right to receive any governmental benefit other than free public education.
126. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
127. Id. at 349.
128. Id. at 340-42. Professor Tribe notes that the distinction drawn by the Court is belied
by its statement that "the degree of difference [between the two cases] can be overstated" andthe fact that the Eldridges' home and furniture had been repossessed, forcing the family to sleep
in one bed. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-56, at 1662. Professor Tribe also notes the significance
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reasoned that a disabled individual's need is likely to be less than that of a
subsistence welfare recipient's because (1) a disabled individual's eligibility
for disability benefits is not based upon financial need; and (2) a disabled
individual's access to private resources and other forms of government
assistance becomes available when the termination of disability benefits places
such an individual below the subsistence level.'
29
Like the eligibility requirement for receipt of the disability benefits at
issue in Mathews, eligibility for the services provided by CWS and APS is
not determined by financial need.'30 Further, an individual receiving
assistance from CWS or APS is also eligible for various other public
assistance programs if his or her financial circumstances so dictate.'
Thus, given the similarities between disability benefits and CWS and APS,
the Supreme Court's finding that the deprivation of non-subsistence welfare
benefits does not have a significant detrimental impact on the denied
recipient's life, is fatal to the "lasting impact" prong of the Plyler quasi-
fundamental rights test. That fact, coupled with the difficulty in establishing
the existence of the first prong of the test,3 2 relegates the right to receive
miscellaneous welfare services to non-quasi-fundamental status.
As to the appropriateness of labelling the right to receive subsistence
welfare benefits and medical welfare services "quasi-fundamental," questions
regarding the precise nature of the Plyler test need to be resolved. The
primary question is whether the test is to be applied in the conjunctive or
disjunctive sense? Also, how much of a direct and certain connection is
required to meet the "maintaining basic institutions" prong? Are there other
"basic institutions" which the Court would be willing to consider that were
not listed in Plyler? Unfortunately, the Court has not revisited the quasi-
fundamental rights analysis espoused in Plyler. This not only leaves these
questions unanswered, but also casts doubt as to the propriety of considering
rights other than free public education to be quasi-fundamental and thus
deserving of intermediate scrutiny when coupled with the presence of a
pseudo quasi-suspect class.
The Court's failure to expound on the Plyler quasi-fundamental rights
which the Mathews decision may have on the Court's scrutiny of welfare legislation: "Plainly,
Mathews signalled a retreat from the Goldberg approach, that both justice and self-preservation
required from an affluent society exacting standards of fairness and liberality toward its
economically marginal members." Id.
129. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 340-42. The Court also indicated that the public's interest in
conserving scarce fiscal resources was a factor in its decision. Id. at 348.
130. CWS eligibility accrues upon notification to the county that a child is "endangered by
abuse, neglect or exploitation." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16504 (Deering 1994). Individuals
18 years or older qualify for the services provided by APS if they are unable to protect their own
interests, are threatened with harm, suffer physical or mental injury due to ignorance, illiteracy,
incompetency or poor health, lack adequate food, shelter or clothing or suffer exploitation or
deprivation. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 15752 (Deering 1994).
131. See generally FACING THE CHALLENGE, supra note 93, at 17-19; LOW-INCOME, supra
note 94, at 22-38.
132. See discussion supra part V.A.1.
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analysis may be due to the Court's penchant for rational basis review of all
economic and social welfare legislation. 33 The presumptive legitimacy for
such legislation in the post-Warren era is demonstrated by a line of cases
beginning with Dandridge v. Williams.'34
In Dandridge, the Court upheld Maryland's administration of AFDC
grants which placed a cap on the amount of aid available to a family
regardless of the number of individuals in that family. 35 The Court stated
that in the area of economics and social welfare, a state does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause so long as the classification has some rational basis
and is free from invidious discrimination.' 36 The Court applied the deferen-
tial McGowan v. Maryland rationality standard'37 even while taking into
account the fact that the "administration of public welfare assistance...
involves the most basic needs of impoverished human beings."'
38
Next in line after Dandridge was Jefferson v. Hackney.139 The issue
before the Court was whether Texas' system of calculating allocatable federal
funds, which applied a larger reduction factor to AFDC recipients than to
recipients of aid to the aged, disabled and the blind, violated equal protec-
tion 40  In upholding the disparate treatment, the Court stated that a
"legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not
subject to a constitutional straitjacket."'' Applying the deferential rational
review standard employed in Dandridge, the Court reasoned that it was not
irrational for Texas to believe that recipients of AFDC were more able to bear
the hardships of indigency than were the sick and elderly.'42 The majority
was not swayed to increase the scrutiny of Texas' benefit allotment scheme
even though there were allegations of racism and the record before the Court
contained evidence that AFDC was a politically unpopular program whose
recipients bore a stigma not associated with the recipients from other
programs. "3
The final case of this deferential line is Lyng v. Castillo.'44 There,
using Fifth Amendment due process, the Court upheld a congressional
amendment to the federal food stamp program which favored individuals
living together as parents-children-siblings over groups of more distant
133. See No\vAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.43, at 947-48; TRIBE, supra note 28, §
16-57, at 1663.
134. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
135. Id. at 472.
136. Id. at 485, 487.
137. See supra text accompanying note 42.
138. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485.
139. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
140. Id. at 545-46.
141. Id. at 546.
142. Id. at 549.
143. Id. at 575 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-57, at 1664.
144. 477 U.S. 635 (1986).
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relatives and unrelated persons living together.'45 The Court opted for the
deferential rational relation test'46 simply because (1) the group consisting
of distant relatives and unrelated persons did not have the characteristics of
a suspect or quasi-suspect class; and (2) the fundamental right associated with
family living arrangements was not burdened.'47 The Court reasoned that
Congress had a rational basis for its differential treatment because the
amendment made it more difficult to defraud the food stamp program and it
minimized unnecessary governmental expenditures.'
41
The Dandridge, Jefferson and Lyng line of cases seems to stand for the
proposition that even though welfare may be important to an indigent
individual's very survival, and even though invidious discrimination may be
an ingredient in the legislated denial, unless there is a "pure" quasi-suspect
classification or a fundamental right involved, the Court will not afford the
right to receive welfare benefits any special constitutional significance. Thus,
even assuming that quasi-fundamental rights analysis is applicable beyond the
right to receive free public education, one would expect that in order for the
right to receive welfare to qualify as a quasi-fundamental right, both elements
of the Plyler test would conclusively need to be established to rebut the
presumption of permissible disparity advanced by Dandridge, Jefferson and
Lyng. As discussed supra, the receipt of subsistence, medical and miscella-
neous welfare benefits and services does not fully satisfy the Plyler two-
pronged test to the same extent as education. Therefore, given the Supreme
Court's bent at only minimal review of social welfare and economic
legislation, it is highly improbable that the right to receive welfare benefits
and services is a quasi-fundamental right. Any argument then, that sections
5 and 6 of Prop. 187 should be subjected to intermediate sprutiny because
they burden a quasi-fundamental right, will likely be summarily discarded by
the Court.
B. Is A Quasi-Suspect Class Involved?
State legislation, such as Prop. 187, which discriminates against illegal
aliens will be viewed with intermediate scrutiny if illegal aliens are consid-
ered a quasi-suspect class. '49 The test to determine whether a group
145. Id. at 636-38.
146. Equal protection claims under the Fifth Amendment are treated just as they are under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
147. Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638. See also Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (rational basis
review of AFDC amendment which provided less aid to families who received child support
appropriate because no fundamental right impinged).
148. Lyng, 477 U.S. at 640.
149. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 266 (6th Cir.
1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S. Aug. 10, 1995) (No. 95-239). Thus far,
the Supreme Court has only extended quasi-suspect status to gender and illegitimacy classifica-
tions. Id. See also Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990). Plaintiffs Gregorio T., et a]., in their class action suit against
21
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qualifies as quasi-suspect usually involves four criteria: (1) a history of
invidious discrimination; (2) an immutable characteristic that is beyond the
members' control and which defines them as a discrete group; (3) lack of
political power; and (4) a characterization that bears no relation to the actual
ability of the members to perform or contribute to society.'
Courts will often apply these same or similar criteria when determining
whether a group is suspect.' The difference however lies in the intensity
of the analysis of each element. Since intermediate scrutiny is not as exacting
a standard as strict scrutiny, it follows that the criteria defining a quasi-
suspect class are equally less demanding.'52
1. History of Invidious Discrimination
This element is derived from the gender classification cases. 3 The
appropriate inquiry is whether the class which the State seeks to legislate has
been historically treated by the public with "an evil eye and an unequal
hand."' 54  It is indisputable that throughout U.S. history, immigrants in
general' 55 have been viewed with suspicion and treated with contempt.
Indeed, "no less a founding father than Benjamin Franklin was demanding to
know why German immigrants should 'be suffered to swarm into our
Settlements, and by herding together, establish their Language and Manners,
to the Exclusion of ours?"". 
56
In the 1840s, immigrants began to encounter real opposition to their
arrival as "'[o]ld Americans who traced their lineage back several genera-
tions, lamented the 'dilution of the native stock."1 57  Nativists began to
organize politically and target Irish immigrants for hate campaigns "because
Proposition 187, assert that "[t]he classification created by Proposition 187 is suspect or quasi-
suspect." Gregorio T. v. Wilson, No. 94-7652, 55 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 1994) (complaint for
declaratory and injunctive relieo. Recall, however, that the Supreme Court has ruled that illegal
alienage is not a suspect classification. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982).
150. See Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638; City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 442-45 (1985); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-87 (1973) (plurality opinion).
151. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 724 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris,
J., concurring), cert denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
152. Any other conclusion would render the Supreme Court's distinction between the two
categories meaningless.
153. See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 685 (plurality opinion) (comparing the discrimination
faced by women to that of African-Americans during slavery).
154. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74. See also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (asking whether the class defined by the discrimination has
been "subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment . . . as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process").
155. "In the early years of the U.S., illegal aliens did not exist... [because there were] no
restrictions whatsoever on immigration." PIERRE N. HAUSER, ILLEGAL ALIENS 21 (1990).
156. BRENT ASHABRANNER, STILL A NATION OF IMIGRANTS 18 (1993) (citation omitted
in original).
157. HAUSER, supra note 155, at 24 (citation omitted in original).
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of their abundance, their poverty and their Catholicism."'' 8 Common in the
Eastern U.S. were employment signs decrying, "No Irish need apply."'59
The next immigrants to suffer hostile sentiment were Chinese Ameri-
cans.' 60 There was fear of a "Yellow Peril," cheap labor and strange
customs and religions.' 6 ' The California legislature prohibited Chinese
Americans from enrolling their children in public schools, marrying whites
or testifying against whites in courts of law.'62 Inevitably, the prejudice led
to bloodshed; the worst incident occurring in 1885 when white rioters killed
28 Chinese miners in Wyoming.'63
Southern and Eastern European immigrants were not immune to the
nativists' fear and contempt.'64 There was concern that this "'darker race'
would 'taint the purity of the national bloodstream."" 65 As a result of this
bigotry, new political groups evolved and lobbied Congress to exclude all
immigrants who were not from Western Europe.'66 Quotas on the number
of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe were eventually established
in favor of peoples with Northern and Western European blood.'67
In more recent years, Mexican illegal immigrants have been blamed for
disease, crime and increasing welfare costs.'68 They have been character-
ized as "'poor, sinister ... shadowy beings who skulked across the border in
the dead of night in order to deprive [citizens] of their jobs and liveli-
hood."" 6 9 In 1990, a gang of vigilante racists routinely dressed in camou-
flage fatigues and shot illegal aliens with paint guns as they attempted to
cross the Mexican-American border in San Diego. 7° In 1992, the White
Aryan Resistance organized an anti-illegal immigration demonstration at the
San Diego-Mexico border which was advertised by leaflets proclaiming that
millions of pregnant illegal aliens were lining up at the border.'
Quite clearly, the historical record is replete with instances of racial
158. Id. at 26-27.
159. Id. at 27.
160. See id.
161. ASHABRANNER, supra note 156, at 19.
162. HAUSER, supra note 155, at 30.
163. Id. at 31.
164. Id. at 39.
165. Id. at 40 (citation omitted in original).
166. Id.
167. ASHABRANNER, supra note 156, at 21.
168. HAUSER, supra note 155, at 62.
169. Id. at 63 (citation omitted in original).
170. John Anner, Racism Exaggerated the Problem of Illegal Immigration, in ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION, supra note 3, at 62, 63.
171. Sara Diamond, Illegal Immigrants Are Unfairly Blamed for U.S. Problems, in ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION, supra note 3, at 97, 99.
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prejudice amounting to invidious discrimination against immigrants. 7 2 The
assertion that undocumented aliens meet this element of the quasi-suspect
class analysis is mandated by the Supreme Court's development of equal
protection to jealously safeguard against racial discrimination.'73
2. Immutability
As used by the Supreme Court, immutability is not an absolute term in
that members of the class need not be entirely unable to change the trait
defining their class. 7 ' All that is required is great difficulty in altering the
trait, such as "requiring a major physical change or a traumatic change of
identity."'75
Immutability is the criteria primarily responsible for the consensus among
the federal appellate courts that homosexuals do not constitute a quasi-suspect
class. "'76 The appellate courts have stated that homosexuality is not immuta-
ble because it is the product of conscious behavior, and it is on the basis of
this behavior that the class is defined.'77 Gender and illegitimacy on the
other hand, are not defined by their members' behavior.
Undocumented status, like homosexuality (as viewed by the judiciary),
is the direct result of conscious, voluntary behavior (entering the U.S. in
violation of federal law) and thus cannot be considered immutable.' A
172. Whether minor immigrants have endured invidious discrimination to a different degree
than their adult counterparts is really an unnecessary determination. Any such discrimination
targeted against adult immigrants certainly affected their immigrant children. Thus, if not the
direct targets of invidious discrimination, immigrant children were nonetheless its indirect
victims. Cf Hale v. Hale, 429 N.E. 2d 340, 345 n.8 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (observing that in
the context of death or divorce, "'the well-being of the child appear[s] ... closely related to the
well-being of the... [remaining] parent' (citation omitted)); Stevens v. Dillard, Nos. 262, 1993
and 276, 1993 consolidated, 1994 Del. LEXIS 329, at *19 (Del. Oct. 27, 1994) ("Our society
daily witnesses children in deprived situations, attributable to the economic or cultural
disadvantages of their custodial parents . . . ."), withdrawn, In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18 (Del.
1995).
173. See generally TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-23, at 1544.
174. Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 726 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
175. Id. (stating that strict immutability is not required for quasi-suspect status because
gender can surgically be changed and illegitimate children can be legitimized by a marriage
ceremony).
176. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 266 (6th
Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S. Aug. 10, 1995) (No. 95-239).
177. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th
Cir. 1990). See, e.g., Equality Found, 54 F.3d at 267 ("Those persons who fall within the orbit
of legislation concerning sexual orientation are so affected . . . by their conduct . . .");
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[H]omosexuality is
primarily behavioral in nature and as such is not immutable."), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003
(1990). But see Watkins, 875 F.2d at 726, 728 (Norris, J., concurring) (concluding that
homosexuals constitute a suspect class); TRIBE, supra note 28, § 1633, at 1616.
178. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982). One may argue that an alien's undocumented
status is immutable because such an alien is ineligible for citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)
(1994) ("No person ... shall ... [become a U.S. citizen by being] naturalized unless... [he
or she has been] lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . ."). However, this argument
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distinction must be drawn however as to undocumented alien children brought
into this country by their undocumented parents. Such a differentiation is
supported by Plyler v. Doe.'79 There, the Court compared undocumented
children of illegal entrants to illegitimate children stating that neither class
could affect their parents' conduct nor their own status.'80 Indeed, the
decision in Plyler can be better understood by recognizing that the Court's
application of intermediate scrutiny was due in part to its implicit finding that
illegal alien children constitute a class deserving of "special [judicial]
solicitude."' 8 '
3. Lack of Political Power
To satisfy this component, the class discriminated against must be
"politically powerless in the sense that [the members] have no ability to
attract the attention of the lawmakers." '182 In finding that the mentally
retarded as a class are not politically powerless, the Court, in City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., reasoned that the legislative response to the
plight of the retarded in general demonstrated their ability to attract the
attention of lawmakers. 8
3
"That [illegal] aliens ... [can]not vote'84 might be seen as demonstrat-
ing their lack of political power .... Indeed, unlike the legislative
record pertaining to homosexuals '86 and the mentally retarded, the legisla-
tive record as to illegal aliens is nearly barren of publicly supported responses
to their plight. However, the immediate enjoinment of Proposition 187 belies
the notion that illegal immigrants as a class are completely politically
powerless. Groups like the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education
Fund actively seek the fair treatment of illegal aliens.'87
ignores the fact that ineligibility results solely from the alien's own conscious, voluntary
behavior. It seems rather disingenuous then to argue that immutability is "achievable."
179. See generally supra part IV.
180. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
181. Id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
182. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985) (emphasis
added).
183. Id. at 443-45 (listing the Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, the Education
of the Handicapped Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
184. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973); THOMAS A. ALEiNIKOFF, IMMIGRA-
TION: PROCESS AND POLICY 1085 (3d ed. 1995).
185. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-23, at 1545.
186. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. See. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("[L]egislatures have addressed and continue to address the discrimination suffered
by homosexuals on account of their sexual orientation through the passage of anti-discrimination
legislation."). But see Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 727 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Norris, J., concurring) ("The very fact that homosexuals have historically been underepresented
in and victimized by political bodies is itself strong evidence that they lack the political power
necessary to ensure fair treatment at the hands of government."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957
(1990).
187. See HAUSER, supra note 155, at 101.
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A finding of political powerlessness is mandated, however, by the Court's
conclusion that women as a class are considered politically powerless because
of their prolonged exclusion from the franchise and their subsequent absence
from decisionmaking councils.'88 Considering the fact that "women do not
constitute a small and powerless minority"'89 yet still meet the political
powerless element, undocumented immigrants, who do constitute a small and
comparatively less powerful minority, must surely meet this element.
4. Inaccurate Stereotypical Characterizations
The proper inquiry as to this element is whether the characteristic which
forms the basis of the discriminatory classification "bears no relation to the
ability to perform or contribute to society."'90 The central concern is that
a legislated classification may be relegating a class to inferior legal status
without regard to the actual capabilities of the class members. 9' Illegitima-
cy, gender and sexual orientation are examples of characteristics which have
no bearing on an individual's ability to perform or contribute to society. 9 2
Undocumented status, however, unlike the characteristics of illegitimacy,
gender and sexual orientation, directly affects an individual's ability to
perform and contribute to society because that individual can neither vote nor
be employed.'93 Proposition 187 thus relegates undocumented aliens to a
position of inferior legal status by denying them benefits available to legal
aliens and citizens, but it does so with regard to their limited ability to
perform and contribute to society.
Tallying up the results of the quasi-suspect class analysis indicates that
adult undocumented immigrants meet only two of the necessary elements:
invidious discrimination and political powerlessness. Undocumented minor
children seem to meet three of the four necessary elements: invidious
discrimination, immutability and political powerlessness. Given these results,
the Plyler Court's emphasis on the mode of entry into the undocumented
188. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685, 686 n.17 (1973) (plurality opinion).
189. Id. at 686 n.17 (plurality opinion).
190. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion).
191. Id. at 687 (plurality opinion).
192. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) ("[I]llegitimacy ... bears no
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society."); Frontiero, 411
U.S. at 686-87 (plurality opinion) ("Statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect
of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the
actual capabilities of its individual members."); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699,
725 (9th Cir. 1989) (Norris, J., concurring) ("Sexual orientation plainly has no relevance to a
person's ability to perform or contribute to society."), cert. denied 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
193. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 prohibits the employment of illegal
aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (1994). This prohibition, however, has not actively been enforced.
Linda Valdez, A Long, 'Shameful'History, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 1995, at GI; Karen Brandon,
Most Illegal Immigrants Cross into U.S. on Visas; Papers Expire, but Visitors Stay, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Aug. 6, 1995, at A3.
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class '94 and the Court's disdain for punishing children for the transgressions
of the parent, it would appear appropriate to label as quasi-suspect, only
undocumented alien children. Whether undocumented alien children qualify
as a "pure" quasi-suspect class, however, is debatable considering (1) the
Plyler Court's failure to explicitly recognize them as such; ' 95 and (2) the
fact that one of the quasi-suspect criteria is unsatisfied (inaccurate stereotypi-
cal characteristic). These two considerations might compel the conclusion
that undocumented alien children constitute at most a "pseudo" quasi-suspect
class: i.e., a class which the Court has only analogized to an existing quasi-
suspect class and which only meets a majority of the quasi-suspect criteria.
Such a class would reasonably be entitled to heightened equal protection
review but to some uncertain degree less than intermediate review. Conceiv-
ably, courts applying a pseudo quasi-suspect analysis could "simply" loosen
the requisite causal nexus between the legislated means and ends. The
appropriate inquiry for such an "inferior" intermediate scrutiny might be
whether the legislated classification is moderately related to an important
governmental objective.'96 A pseudo quasi-suspect class could qualify for
"full" intermediate scrutiny, though, only in situations such as Plyler, where
the burdening of a quasi-fundamental right is also present.
As to undocumented immigrant adults, an additional factor warrants not
awarding the class quasi-suspect status: it would be inequitable to reward
intermediate equal protection review to individuals who consciously and
voluntarily violate the law while denying such review to groups like the
mentally retarded' 9 and the elderly' 98 whose character is not defined by
illegal conduct.'99 Further, granting the same level of equal protection
review enjoyed by gender classes and illegitimate children to adult illegal
aliens could not rest on any definable, justifiable principles considering the
fundamental distinction between the manner of the groups' entry into their
classes.
194. Conscious, voluntary behavior on the part of undocumented adults. Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 219 n.19, 219-20.
195. The Court merely compared undocumented alien children to illegitimate children in the
context of immutability. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220. Nowhere did the majority apply any of the
other quasi-suspect criteria, mention that it was pursuing a quasi-suspect analysis or conclude that
a new quasi-suspect class had been discovered.
196. The tenability of such an analysis might be questionable given the already amorphous
nature of equal protection review. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
197. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
198. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
199. See State v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 627 (Alaska 1993) (holding that illegal aliens are
ineligible to receive dividends from the state's natural resources fund because "'giving dividends
to illegal aliens would ... contravene public policy by rewarding individuals for illegal acts'
(citation omitted in original)).
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C. Is A Quasi-Fundamental Right Being Incidentally Burdened?200
Welfare legislation which impinges upon a fundamental right is subject
to strict judicial scrutiny. 20' By way of analogy then, it is possible to assert
that welfare legislation which impinges upon a quasi-fundamental right should
be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny.202 Sections 5 and 6 of Prop. 187,
which would have the effect of incidentally burdening a child's access to
public education, should thus be subject to intermediate equal protection
review.0 3
An indigent undocumented child who is denied welfare benefits and
services is dramatically less capable of exploiting his or her access to public
education than is an indigent child who receives such assistance.2 4 Further,
such a child is obviously more susceptible to illness, malnourishment,
homelessness and crime. 05 Unquestionably, these deleterious conditions
would interfere with a child's attempt to exercise his or her quasi-fundamental
right to receive a public education.0 6 In fact, to a child afflicted with any
one or more of these conditions, obtaining a public education would be a
lower priority than would remedying the deleterious condition(s). 20 7 Thus,
like the indigent individuals in Shapiro v. Thompson"8 and Memorial Hosp.
200. See supra note 87 for the distinction applied in this Note between the "incidental
burdening" of a quasi-fundamental right and the "direct involvement" of a quasi-fundamental
right.
201. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 13, § 14.43, at 948. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa Cty., 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (one year residency requirement for non-emergency
hospitalization and medical care invalidated because of interference with fundamental right of
interstate travel); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one year residency requirement
for welfare assistance impermissibly interfered with fundamental right of interstate travel).
202. "[A]lthough welfare is not a free-standing and independent claim within the U.S.
constitutional framework, specific welfare provisions may enjoy a kind of derivative status as the
means needed to carry into practice the rights that are guaranteed explicitly or by clear
implication." WOODROW WILSON INT'L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, A CULTURE OF RIGHTS 262(Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991).
203. Note that undocumented alien adults are not included within this analysis because they
are disqualified by age from receiving the quasi-fundamental right discussed.
204. See SHERMAN, supra note 112, at 26-27. Poverty inhibits the quality and quantity of
education by placing necessary learning resources such as academic and supplementary texts,
school supplies, eyeglasses and hearing aids out of reach. Id.
205. Id. at 12.
206. The effects of illness and disease on an indigent child decrease the frequency and
quality of school attendance. Id. at 78. "[N]utritional problems . . . [create] future learning
problems such as learning disabilities, low educational achievement, and subsequent school
failure." Id. at 61-63. Homelessness both directly and indirectly interferes with a child's access
to and exploitation of public education by creating enrollment and attendance difficulties,
CALIFORNIA'S UNFINISHED BATTLE, supra note 122, at 40-41, and inadequate living conditions
in which to learn, SHERMAN, supra note 112, at 11, 18. The emotional and psychological stress
resulting from exposure to crime hampers a child's ability to succeed in school. See SHERMAN,
supra note 112, at 38-39.
207. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 234 (1982) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[To an
individual in immediate need .... [public welfare benefits] may be more desirable than the right
to be educated.").
208. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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v. Maricopa Cty.2°9 who were effectively precluded from exercising the
fundamental right of interstate travel because of state legislation denying
public assistance, the indigent undocumented child would likewise be
effectively precluded from exercising the quasi-fundamental right of free
public education.
Equal protection therefore requires that the right of a free public
education to both the legal and illegal child alike, be viewed as insuring to
indigent undocumented children the same right to vital government welfare
benefits and privileges as are enjoyed by legally resident and citizen indigent
children." ' Such a requirement thereby compels the application of interme-
diate scrutiny to state legislation such as Sections 5 and 6 of Prop. 187 which
seeks to burden an undocumented child's quasi-fundamental right of access
to free public education.
D. Do Sections 5 And 6 Comport With Some Federal Mandate?
"[Ilf the Federal government has by uniform rule prescribed what it
believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the
States may, of course, follow the federal direction."2 ' This principle was
employed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sudomir v. Mc-
Mahon.2" 2 There, the court held that California's denial of AFDC benefits
to illegal aliens was subject to only rational basis review. '3 Judge Sneed,
quoting the above referenced language of Justice Brennan, concluded that
heightened review of the denial was inappropriate because California was
following Congress' mandate set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(33) regarding
participation in the AFDC program.1 4 Section 602(a)(33) requires that
states condition eligibility for benefits on an individual being "either (A) a
citizen, or (B) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence or
otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of
law ... .215 The court interpreted this statute to require that "states not
only... grant benefits to eligible aliens but also... deny benefits to aliens
who do not satisfy" section 602(a)(33)'s criteria. z 6 As to the validity of
California's action, the court stated that "[i]t would make no sense to say that
Congress has plenary power in the area of immigration and naturalization and
then hold that .. . [equal protection] impels the states to refrain from
209. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
210. The same proposition is stated by Justice Marshall in Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 261,
but in the context of interstate travel.
211. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19. See also supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
212. 767 F.2d 1456 (1985).
213. Id. at 1465-66.
214. Id. at 1466.
215. Id. at 1457 (emphasis omitted).
216. Id. at 1466.
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adhering to the federal guidelines." 7
California's position with respect to Sections 5 and 6 of Prop. 187 (i.e.,
denying welfare benefits and services to illegal aliens) is analogous to its
position in Sudomir under section 602(a)(33). The only distinction is that the
denials asserted by Prop. 187 are state-based whereas the denial asserted in
Sudomir was federal-based. The distinction hardly seems of great import
though considering that the primary focus of the Plyler-Sudomir test is on
"'follow[ing] the federal direction""'z  and "'mirror[][ing] federal objec-
tives."'219 Sections 5 and 6 of Prop. 187 seek such a parallel course with
the overall federal policy of denying welfare benefits and services to illegal
aliens. Not only is Prop. 187's denial of AFDC benefits in line with
congressional policy, but so too its denial of food stamp assistance,220 Medi-
Cal coverage,"' aid to the aged, blind and disabled,222 and general relief
coverage.223 Given that Prop. 187's denial of benefits to illegal aliens so
closely mirrors congressional policy, Plyler and Sudomir indicate that the
appropriate standard of equal protection review for Sections 5 and 6 is
something less than intermediate scrutiny. This conclusion is especially
compelling in regard to adult illegal immigrants considering that other factors
such as pseudo quasi-suspect status, quasi-suspect status, the direct involve-
ment of a quasi-fundamental right or the incidental burdening of a quasi-
fundamental right are absent.
VI. APPLICATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARDS
A. Intermediate Scrutiny
In reviewing the constitutionality of Sections 5 and 6 of Prop. 187 on
equal protection grounds, intermediate scrutiny could be triggered by either
the incidental burdening of a quasi-fundamental right (an indigent undocu-
217. Id.
218. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1466 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
219 n.19 (1982)).
219. Id. at 1466 n.15 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 225).
220. "No individual ... shall be eligible to participate in the food stamp program ...
unless he or she is (1) a resident of the United States and (2) either (A) a citizen or (B) an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence .... ." 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o (1994).
221. "[N]o payment may be made to a State . . . for medical assistance [other than
emergency care] furnished to an alien who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence or
otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law." 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(v)
(1988).
222. An "aged, blind, or disabled individual [is one] who ... is a resident of the United
States, and is either (I) a citizen or (II) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence or
otherwise permanently residing in the United States under color of law .... " 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(1)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).
223. California's general relief program has no federal counterpart but is consistent with the
federal policy of denying aid to illegal aliens: "Every county and every city and county shall
relieve and support all ... indigent persons ... lawfully resident therein . . . ." CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 17000 (Deering 1994).
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mented child's access to public education)224 or the presence of a quasi-
suspect class (undocumented alien children.)22 5 The appropriate inquiry then
is whether Prop. 187's denial of subsistence, non-emergency medical and
miscellaneous welfare benefits and services is substantially related to the
achievement of an important governmental interest.226
California's interest in denying social welfare and health care benefits
and services to undocumented aliens is to preserve those limited benefits and
services for legally resident aliens and natural citizens. 2" The Supreme
Court has indicated that "' [A] State has a valid interest in preserving the
fiscal integrity of its programs.'"221 Whether such an interest is "important"
per se for purposes of intermediate scrutiny is doubtful, however, given the
Court's disdain for such articulated interests in situations where invidious
discrimination is present in the legislative scheme.2 9 In the face of Plyler
v. Doe, it is difficult to argue that a statute which distinguishes between
classes composed of legally resident children and citizen children on the one
hand and undocumented alien children on the other in the allocation of public
assistance is not invidious. Neither class is responsible for the status upon
which such a statute would operate, yet one is singled out for disparate
treatment solely on the basis of a third party's conduct.23° The invidious
nature of such discrimination is evidenced by Justice Brennan's statement in
Plyler that "legislation directing the onus of a parent's misconduct against his
children does not comport with fundamental conceptions of justice.""23
Thus, not even the mandate of permissible disparity advanced by the
Dandridge, Jefferson, and Lyng line of cases could serve to validate
California's interest in the discrimination created by Prop. 187.
Further, even if the State's interest in preserving its limited welfare
resources is requisitely "important," denying such benefits to illegal alien
children may not "substantially" effectuate the preservation of the State's
224. See supra part V.C. Note that based on the analysis presented in supra part V.A., the
right to receive subsistence, medical and miscellaneous welfare benefits and services is not quasi-
fundamental.
225. See supra part V.B. The possibility that undocumented immigrant children constitute
only a pseudo quasi-suspect class and the resulting ramifications thereby imposed on the level
of scrutiny will be discussed infra under this heading.
226. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
227. See supra note 74.
228. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971) (alteration in original) (quoting
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969)). See also USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
543 (1973).
229. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 (1982); Moreno, 413 U.S. at 543; Graham, 403
U.S. at 375; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 633.
230. This argument assumes that a child becomes "undocumented" by being brought into
the U.S. by his or her parents rather than by entering on his or her own. Under this assumption,
the character of a child's relation to this country is determined exclusively by parental conduct.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220.
231. Id.
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limited welfare resources. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan232 is
instructive as to the degree of causation required. There, the Court struck
down a statute which excluded males from enrolling in a state-funded nursing
program.233 The State's justification for its exclusionary policy was to
compensate women for the discrimination traditionally asserted against
them.234 Men, however, whose presence supposedly adversely affected the
women students, were allowed to audit the classes.235 The Court found that
the State's exclusionary policy was not substantially related to the legitimate
interest of educational affirmative action because the audit program rendered
the exclusionary mechanism ineffective.236
Such an attenuated causal connection also plagues Proposition 187.
Although "the literature on the public fiscal impact of illegal aliens reflects
considerable agreement among researchers that illegal aliens are a net
cost, 2 37 any fiscal savings obtained by denying public assistance to illegal
alien children may be offset by a resulting increase in crime, disease,
disability and serious illness.238 Moreover, given the correlation between
factors such as crime, disease, disability and illness and the quantity and
quality of a child's education,239 a considerable increase in education costs
would likely result as well because such poverty-related factors increase the
likelihood of grade level repetition and the need for special education
services.24° Also, illegal alien children may simply substitute free emer-
gency medical care (which is not proscribed by Prop. 187) in place of any
subsidized non-emergency medical care they may have previously received.
Thus, Proposition 187, like Mississippi's legislation in Hogan, provides for
an exception to the sought-after result, thereby undercutting the causal
connection between the method employed to preserve state funds and the
actual preservation of those funds.
The Supreme Court's decisions indicate that intermediate equal protection
review requires that states present quantifiable relationships between the
means of the challenged classification and the ends. Considering that (1)
232. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
233. Id. at 730.
234. Id. at 727.
235. Id. at 730.
236. Id. at 730-31.
237. NATIONAL NET COST, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that twelve of thirteen studies
conducted since 1984 "concluded that illegal aliens generate more in public costs than they
contribute in revenues to government"). As to the specific drain on California's economy, one
study identified by the GAO put the figure at $2.7 billion dollars for the 1994-1995 fiscal year.
Id. at 28. Of that figure, $395 million dollars was expected to be paid in the form of emergency
medical welfare services. PHILIP J. ROMERO ET AL., GOVENOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND
RESEARCH, SHIFTING THE COSTS OF A FAILED FEDERAL POLICY 6 (1994). As to subsistence
welfare benefits in the form of AFDC, approximately $260 million dollars was expected to be
spent on the citizen children of illegal aliens. Id. at 7.
238. See SHERMAN, supra note 112, at 64-77, 87-93, 114.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 204-07.
240. SHERMAN, supra note 112, at 114.
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uncertain costs will likely arise from a denial of subsistence, medical and
miscellaneous welfare benefits and services to illegal alien children;24' and
(2) an alternative means of obtaining medical welfare services exists which
could undermine any fiscal savings achieved, the Court is likely to find that
a substantial relationship is missing between the means utilized by Prop. 187
and the ends sought. Even if the causation requirement is relaxed on the
ground that undocumented immigrant children constitute a pseudo quasi-
suspect class, the connection between the denial of public assistance and fiscal
savings would still be too tenuous. Indeed, the causation requirement would
almost have to be relaxed to the degree occupied by the rational relation test
of McGowan v. Maryland242 to sufficiently connect the means to the ends.
Thus, regardless of whether undocumented immigrant children constitute a
psuedo quasi-suspect or a quasi-suspect class, the result is the same for
causation purposes.
It is doubtful that sections 5 and 6 of Prop. 187, as they apply to illegal
immigrant children, can withstand any form of intermediate judicial scrutiny.
Both an "important" governmental objective and the means by which to
definitively achieve that objective are missing.
B. Covertly Heightened Rational Relation Review
Failure to find that undocumented alien adults constitute a pseudo quasi-
suspect or quasi-suspect class, or that the right to receive subsistence, medical
and miscellaneous welfare benefits and services is quasi-fundamental does not
leave this class entirely defenseless if it can be established that invidious
discrimination pervades Prop. 187.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,243 the Supreme Court
struck down a Texas city ordinance which required a special use permit for
homes for the mentally retarded. The city's insistence on a permit rested on
several factors including the negative attitude of property owners located near
the intended facility and the fears of neighboring elderly residents.24 Since
the Court believed that the requirement of the city permit reflected irrational
fears and prejudice against the mentally retarded, it declined to defer to the
city's discretion.245
The Court claimed to be utilizing the mere rational relation test in which
"legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
241. The costs associated with creating a subclass of poverty stricken children within
California are uncertain considering: (I) poverty merely increases the likelihood that a given
individual will generate costs associated with disease, illness, injury and anti-social behavior,
SHERMAN, supra note 112, at 61; and (2) the inherent difficulties in determining the population
size of undocumented immigrant children, NATIONAL NET COST, supra note 3, at 3.
242. 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.").
243. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
244. Id. at 448.
245. Id. at 450.
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drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 246
However, the Court was clearly applying some form of covertly heightened
review.247 Under this heightened form of rationality review "there is no
place for judicial imagination or hypothesizing about possible legislative
purposes. 248 If the Court believes that the legislation might be grounded
in prejudice, it will adjust the traditional rational relation standard to take into
account the possibility that the classification is the result of a "bare ... desire
to harm a politically unpopular group., 249  Covertly heightened scrutiny
thus increases the government's task in justifying the challenged classifica-
tion."'
To be afforded Cleburne-style heightened equal protection review, those
challenging Sections 5 and 6 of Prop. 187 must show that the motivation
behind the initiative's enactment was discriminatory in character with the sole
purpose being a desire to injure undocumented immigrants.25" ' The pre-
enactment statement of a Prop. 187 co-founder to the effect that supporters
of Prop. 187 are "the posse" and the initiative is "the rope" evinces such a
malevolent motivation. 2  Under Cleburne, such unsubstantiated fears and
irrational prejudice are simply irrational grounds on which to base Califor-
nia's interest in preserving its limited welfare resources. The State then, in
order to avoid the heavy burden of justifying its classification,253 must be
able to demonstrate that its classification is based on a sincere, independent
desire to preserve the financial integrity of its treasury.254 Given the
animosity which has historically plagued immigrants of color, however,255
California faces an uphill battle.
The State might be able to avoid the result obtained in Cleburne, though,
246. Id. at 440 (citations omitted).
247. See id. at 456 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Cleburne's ordinance surely would be valid
under the traditional rational-basis test applicable to economic and commercial regulation."); See
also TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-3, at 1444.
248. Cobum v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 990 (D. Kan. 1985).
249. USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
250. State v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 626 (Alaska 1993).
251. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450); Griffin High School v. Ill. High School, 822 F.2d 671, 675-76 (7th
Cir. 1987); Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 917 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
252. Patrick J. McDonnel, Prop. 187 Turns Up Heat in U.S. Immigration Debate, L.A.
TimS, Aug. 10, 1994, at Al.
253. According to the Ninth Circuit, upon a showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to
the government to establish that its classification has a rational basis. Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d
1160, 1166 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 655 (1992). But cf Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535, 575 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I am not at all certain who should bear the
burden of proof on the question of racial discrimination.").
254. Jefferson demonstrates the importance of this proposition. In that case, the Court
accepted Texas' version of the evidence to the effect that its AFDC reduction scheme was not
racially or ethnically motivated. Id. at 547. The Court therefore applied deferential rationality
review. Id. at 549. Had the scheme's challengers been able to support their allegations of a
racial and ethnic impetus, the Court would have deviated from rational basis review. Id. at 547.
255. Tyrone Beason, Diversity Forum Takes Look at Life on Margins, SEATrLE TIMES, Feb.
12, 1995, at BI. See also supra text accompanying notes 160-71.
[Vol. 32
34
California Western Law Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol32/iss1/6
1995] THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION 187 163
by arguing that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, when applying Cleburne-
style heightened rationality review to cases involving the federal govern-
ment's disparate treatment of homosexuals, has indicated a willingness to
accept less exacting justifications for discriminatory classifications even in the
presence of hostile motivations. 6  Using Cleburne rational basis review,
the Ninth Circuit, in High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
upheld the Department of Defense's (DoD) policy of subjecting homosexual
applicants for security clearances to expanded investigations.257 It did so
even after finding that the challenged policy may have been tinged with
prejudice.258  The court examined the government's "inexact" 259 evidence
showing that homosexuals are sometimes targeted by foreign espionage
agencies because of their susceptibility to coercion260 and concluded that the
DoD had established a rational relationship between the expanded investiga-
tions and increased security risks posed by homosexuals.26 '
Arguing that it would be inequitable to require precise justifications for
legislation burdening undocumented alien adults when homosexuals, whose
status appears more immutable, receive less favorable treatment, California
might be able to withstand the inference that Proposition 187 was enacted on
a tide of irrational fear and prejudice. If such an argument is accepted, the
fiscal savings which would accrue by denying subsistence, medical and
miscellaneous welfare benefits and services to undocumented immigrant
adults would not need to be the most efficient and logical means of
preserving limited public funds.
Opponents of Prop. 187 can distinguish cases such as High Tech Gays
on the ground that the country's national security is a much more compelling
interest than a state's preservation of limited welfare funds. Therefore,
potentially invidious classifications that involve the former interest are entitled
to greater judicial deference.262 The High Tech Gays comparison argument
is fraught with a greater infirmity, though, as it could lead California down
the USDA v. Moreno" avenue of defeat. In Moreno, the Court was faced
with the constitutionality of an amendment to the Food Stamp Act of 1964
256. See Pruitt; High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th
Cir. 1990).
257. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 575. Although the High Tech Gays court did not
expressly state that it was applying Cleburne rational basis review, this fact was confirmed two
years latei in Pruitt: "[I]t is clear that we applied the type of 'active' rational basis review
employed by the Supreme Court in City of Cleburne .... ." Pruitt, 963 F.2d at 1165-66.
258. High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 578 n.14.
259. Id. at 578 ("'[T]he attempt to define not only the individual's future actions, but those
of outside and unknown influences renders the "grant or denial of security clearance ... an
inexact science at best .... (citations omitted)).
260. Id. at 576-77.
261. Id. at 578.
262. "The special deference we owe the military's judgment necessarily affects the scope
of the court's inquiry into the rationality of the military's policy." Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677,
686 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
263. 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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which "was intended to prevent so called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes'
from participating in the food stamp program.""26 The Court invalidated
the statute as amended, not by requiring a more precise fit between the means
and ends (i.e., the Cleburne approach), but rather, simply by decreeing the
asserted goal "illegitimate."265  Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
explained that political unpopularity alone, without reference to independent
considerations in the public interest, can not serve as a legitimate governmen-
tal interest. 66 Thus, if California attempts to invoke the protection of High
Tech Gays by admitting that Prop. 187 may have malicious underpinnings,
it automatically opens itself up to a Moreno attack.
C. Rational Basis Review
In the event that the State can rebut the inference that the enactment of
Prop. 187 was maliciously motivated or alternatively, that the High Tech
Gays exception applies, rational basis review of Sections 5 and 6 is
appropriate. The proper inquiry then is whether the denial of welfare benefits
and services to undocumented alien adults267 is rationally related to
California's interest in preserving its limited welfare resources.268 In
describing the obligatory causal nexus between means and ends, the Court has
stated that it is "'constitutionally irrelevant whether [the legislature's] ...
reasoning in fact [supports] . . . the legislative decision . . .' because this
Court has never insisted [in the area of social welfare legislation] that a
legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute., 269
Since mathematical precision between means and ends is not required
to withstand rational basis scrutiny, the denial of subsistence, medical and
miscellaneous welfare benefits and services to undocumented alien adults
could conceivably preserve some of the limited funds in the State's treasury.
Under mere rationality review, California would have "no obligation to
produce evidence to sustain the rationality of . . . [its] classification . . .
[since] '[A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact finding and
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical
data.""'27  Proposition 187's denial of public assistance to undocumented
alien adults would thus be deemed rationally related to the State's interest of
preserving limited public funds notwithstanding the effectiveness of such a
264. Id. at 534.
265. Id. The Court used the formulation of the rational basis test which requires that "the
challenged classification... rationally further some legitimate governmental interest." Id.
266. Id. at 534-35.
267. Undocumented alien children most likely qualify for some type of intermediate judicial
scrutiny. See discussion supra part V.B-C.
268. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2648 (1993).
269. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz; 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (quoting
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)).
270. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643 (third alteration in original) (quoting F.C.C. Beach
Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2098 (1993)).
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denial. Most certainly, the Dandridge, Jefferson and Lyng line of cases
mandates such an outcome.27'
CONCLUSION
Sections 5 and 6 of Proposition 187 should be invalidated to the extent
that they discriminate against the class consisting of undocumented alien
children. Such a class should be deemed quasi-suspect or pseudo quasi-
suspect because of the history of invidious discrimination displayed against
it, its immutable character and its lack of political power. As a quasi-suspect
or pseudo quasi-suspect class, undocumented alien children are entitled to
intermediate scrutiny or inferior intermediate scrutiny. However, even if
undocumented alien children do not constitute a quasi-suspect or pseudo
quasi-suspect class, they should still be entitled to intermediate scrutiny
because Sections 5 and 6 burden the class' access to, and utilization of a
quasi-fundamental right: free public education.
The right to receive subsistence, medical and miscellaneous welfare
benefits and services is not quasi-fundamental as that term is defined in Plyler
v. Doe. While the denial of subsistence welfare benefits and medical welfare
services has a lasting impact on an indigent's ability to participate within the
community, the requisite causal connection between their receipt and the
maintenance of the political, economic and social institutions of this country
is absent. Miscellaneous welfare services fail to conclusively establish either
such requirement.
To the extent that Sections 5 and 6 discriminate against undocumented
alien adults, the means by which the State is attempting to conserve its
limited welfare resources may not be sufficiently related to the actual
achievement of that goal to survive the covertly heightened rational relation
review espoused in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cr., Inc. Such
review could be triggered by the animosity historically displayed toward this
class and the likelihood that the initiative was enacted on a tide of irrational
fear and prejudice. Further, California's interest in preserving its limited
welfare resources is probably not sufficient enough to allow it to opt out of
the Cleburne-style heightened rationality review. Alternatively, using the
same trigger mechanism necessary for heightened rationality review, the
Court could invalidate Sections 5 and 6 simply based on the presence of an
illegitimate goal.
Strong arguments exist however which urge the review of Sections 5 and
6 as they apply to illegal immigrant adults under the deferential rational basis
test traditionally employed in the area of social welfare and economic
legislation. Paramount of which is the argument that individuals should not
be rewarded for conscious, voluntary illegal conduct. Additionally, the fact
271. This line of cases stands for the proposition that all social welfare and economic
legislation must be given great judicial deference. See supra text accompanying notes 133-48.
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that the federal government has seen fit to deny welfare benefits and services
to illegal aliens suggests that the states may follow suit so long as the
requirements of minimal equal protection are satisfied.
The equal protection challenge to Sections 5 and 6 is of national
importance as other states are considering measures to deal with the effects
of large populations of illegal immigrants. The resolution of this challenge
can be expected to shed light on constitutionally important related issues such
as the continued propriety of the Plyler quasi-fundamental rights analysis and
Cleburne-style heightened rationality review, and the determination of the
proper standard of review with which to scrutinize legislation burdening
homosexuals. Thus, regardless of the outcome, the constitutional determina-
tion of Sections 5 and 6 of Proposition 187 will have profound and far
reaching effects.
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